Abstract

The axis of this investigation is the notion of the innate and internal language proposed by Jerry Fodor which had as its main chalenge, to surpass the 20th century anatical tradition fundamented on Wittgenstein’s anti-mentalism and his negation of a private language. Since Fodor’s Language of Thought Hipothesis might be equivocally associated to the concept of natural language, he suggests a distinction between them by considering that the Language of Thought must be understood as an internal manipulation of symbols. However, the term “internal” has generated controversy once confronted with the wittgeinsteinian tradition. Therefore, in this paper, we put forward the wideness of range and the limits of the Fodorian hipothesis of a Language of Thought, especifically with the objective of discussing the impass related to the conception of the adjective “internal” suscitated by such hipothesis.

Keywords: mentalism, language of thought, meaning, internal language.