Abstract

The objective of this work is to show that, in relation to the use of psychological terms, Wittgenstein takes a very particular form of expressivism. Some authors try to show that Wittgenstein is an expressivist in the traditional sense; others seek to argue that the philosopher is not an expressivist in any sense. For Do Carmo, both ways of understanding Wittgenstein's position is deeply misguided and , in this paper , he tries to defend not only takes on certain assumptions that are Wittgenstein 's expressivism, but also that his position is potentially able to overcome some difficulties, as the descriptivist fallacy, for example. His strategy will be to consider, first, how the philosopher seeks to show the absurdity of Moore - paradoxical sentences using as a backdrop the work of Eduardo Ferreira das Neves Filho, and a second stage, to show that the treatment of Wittgensteinian psychological terms precisely consists in dissolving the dichotomy "description - expression." In the third section of this article, Neves Filho seeks to answer some analyzes and criticisms made ​​by Do Carmo in the previous two sections, highlighting some implications of the assumption of a strong expressivism for a solution to Moore 's paradox .

Keywords: expressivism, descriptvism, Moore’s Paradox.