Abstract

In this article I intend to approach Heidegger's reading of Hegel's Science of Logic, focusing on the question of the finitude and the infinitude. I shall expose, in a first moment, Hegel's critique of the “finite thinking”, and afterwards I shall present the controversy brought forth by The onto-theo-logic consitution of metaphysics (1957): I will try to show how Heidegger's task in this text – to make clear the difference between his and Hegel's thinking, taking the Science of Logic as a refference –, contributes to the destruction of the infinite-like intentions of metaphysics. I shall then try to show, as well, that although their philosophical endeavours are different, the critique that both Hegel and Heidegger direct to the metaphysical tradition are, in fact, a critique of the language which constitutes and regulates the discourse of such tradition.

KEYWORDS: Onto-theo-logy, Heidegger, Hegel, logic, metaphysics.