Abstract

If objectivity in scientific and empirical judgments is possible by the existence of independent entities, what kind of facts could be the possible grounds for objectivity in ethical-moral judgments? Both Putnam and Habermas hold that values could have certain objectivity that comes from an intersubjective recognition about evaluative standars for which we can find good reasons in the context of a particular lifestyle. However, for Habermas, in the situation of contemporary societies where the matter is how to regulate the conflicts and relationships between diverse groups with conflicting ideals, that is no longer sufficient validity. The objectives of this paper are: 1) Rebuild the basic arguments of this debate. 2) take a view on some of the points in question, indicating a way to integrate aspects of both views, which I think could get the goal they share, this is, to ground the possibility of a cognitivist ethics that circumvents the problems of relativism without falling into the difficulties of metaphysical realism.

Keywords: Objectivity, thick ethical concepts, fact-value entanglement.