Abstract

This paper aims to present an analysis of Rawls on freedom, linked to the conception of person, as a central point of his political liberalism. This analysis includes both the negative freedom and the positive in the I. Berlin classification, in his essay Two concepts of liberty. The appropriation of negative freedom by Rawls, which is expressed in the basic freedoms ("primary goods”), is present with priority in the first principle of justice. The model conception of person constructs by Rawls implies to take over the idea of freedom as something that conceptually belongs to the person in regard to its autonomy, therefore, accomplishing the requirement of a positive concept of freedom. As a result of this analysis, the recognition of freedom and equality of persons and their status as moral subjects plays a key role that each person ascribes to himself as a free and   moral subject, and considers the other as well as having equal capacity.

Keywords: freedom, person, political liberalism.