Abstract

This study reconstructs some of the major criticisms of the ethics of virtue to the ethics of Kant and examines such criticism in the light of the debate between Kant and Schiller as to the role of duty and inclinations in moral actions. Proponents of the ethics of virtue criticize the dominance of ethics based on principles (Kantianism and utilitarianism) in contemporary moral thought. However, it is not always clear exactly which ethical conception these criticisms are addressed to and if, instead of a critique of the ethics of Kant, these criticisms are first aimed at the status quo of contemporary moral philosophy. The main criticism of the ethics of Kant considers the absence of a role to feelings and emotions in actions endowed with moral value. However, as will be shown, feelings and emotions are relevant to Kant’s moral philosophy, and therefore these criticisms are not directed to the ethics of Kant, but rather to a caricature of it.

Keywords: Ethics, virtue, duty, emotion.