Abstract

In The Sources of Normativity Korsgaard argues that Hume’s moral project is to be interpreted as both naturalistic and normative. Our reconstruction of this interpretation claims that Korsgaard ascribes to Hume an argument analogous to the “regress argument”, which has as a consequence the view that, on Hume’s metaethics, human nature has unconditional (and intrinsic) value and, as such, is a source of practical normativity. If this is correct, Hume should be interpreted as a reductionist naturalist about moral value, trying to reduce evaluative statements to descriptive ones (about human nature). We shall offer reasons to resist this interpretation, denying that such a “regress argument” applies to Hume and defending the view that Hume’s metaethics plays an explanatory role, but not justificatory, of our moral practices.

Keywords: Hume, Korsgaard, metaethics, ethics.